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The St. Louis Rams: The Greatest Public Financing Show on Earth
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Introduction
This case study research explores how and why the
National Football League (NFL) Rams both arrived
in St. Louis (1995) and departed St. Louis (2016). In
order to address these questions, through archival
and secondary data, the research examines the
unique interrelated history of St. Louis and the NFL,
including both economics and public financing.1

Major League Baseball (MLB), dedicated academic
economic NFL literature is relatively small,
especially in comparison to MLB. However,
academic economic NFL literature is starting to
increase, both in frequency and relevance.3 Relative
to the NFL economic structure, John Vrooman,
Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University,
states,
Sports leagues are unique in that individual
clubs are mutually interdependent in their
cooperative production of competitive games.
As joint members of natural cartels each sports
team is only as strong as its weakest opponent.
Over the last half century the National Football
League (NFL) has become the most
economically powerful sports league in the
world largely because it has also been the most
egalitarian. In 2010 NFL clubs pooled and
shared two-thirds of over $8 billion in revenues
among 32 franchises. The underlying source of
NFL economic strength has been a survivalist
“league-think” mentality that developed from
the outset of the NFL-AFL war 1960–1966.
Evenly shared national media money has grown
at a compound rate of 12% from $47 million
annually at the time of the actual NFL merger in
1970 to $4 billion under 2012–2013 TV contract
extensions. Over the last 2 decades, however, a
major threat to league-thinking solidarity has
merged from an individualist counterrevolution
in unshared venue revenue. During the luxuryseat stadium building frenzy that followed the
watershed
1993
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), the proportion of teamspecific venue revenue has doubled from 10 to
20% of total revenue. This once-tight syndicate
now finds itself split into those teams with new
venues and those without.4

Case studies are utilized in answering “how” and/or
“why” questions, particularly when the researcher
has minimal to no control over events and the
primary focus is on contemporary phenomenon
within a reality context. These types of case studies
are often explanatory in nature, complemented by
exploratory and descriptive research. In general, the
how and why require researchers to follow
operational links over time, instead of isolated
occurrences.2

NFL Economics
Even though the NFL is economically the largest
professional sports team league in America and
substantially bigger than its closest competitor,
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Even before the most recent CBA, from 1991
through 2011, NFL team values increase over 12%,
while profits grow 7.7%. Relative to these figures,
owners are leveraging their teams better, including
inclusion in large entertainment complexes.5
Referring to NFL franchise values, locations, and
stadium economics, Jason Winfree, Associate
Professor at the University of Idaho in the
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural
Sociology, concludes,
This study goes on to investigate how a team’s
stadium is related to this value. While media
contracts explain part of the increasing values of
NFL teams, new stadiums also play a crucial
role. However, the public does not see the same
economic benefits as the team, even though they
often pay for a large part of the stadium.
Because of the market structure of the NFL,
they are able to extract public funds for these
stadiums. Thus, even though fans may not want
their team to leave, it is difficult to see stadium
subsidies as a good economic investment.6
However, according to Taxpayers Protection
Alliance (TPA), a non-profit non-partisan
organization, from 1995 through 2015, 29 out of 31
NFL stadiums received public subsidies, totaling
nearly $7 billion.7 In addition, according to
Brookings Institution, an independent nonprofit
public policy organization, since 2000, through the
usage of municipal bonds in stadium construction
financing, which are federal tax-exempt, NFL
stadium federal subsidies total $1.11 billion out of
$3.2 billion total stadium subsidies. Further, if the
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high-income bond holders are included, which
receive federal tax breaks, the NFL stadium federal
revenue loss totals $1.29 billion out of $3.7 billion
total stadium federal revenue loss.8
Signed August 4, 2011, after the longest league labor
stoppage in NFL history, 136-day lockout,9 the
current CBA, which expires after the 2020 season,10
is the most significant NFL economic restructuring
since the 1993 agreement.11 The significant changes
primarily impact four areas: player and health safety,
retired player benefits, draft/free agency system, and
entry level compensation system.12 One, all team and
league revenues are eligible for player
compensation. Two, the salary cap is set so players
can share within 47-48.5% of total league revenues,
which is based upon 55% league media revenues,
45% NFL Ventures revenue, 40% local team
revenues. Three, in 2011-2012, the league must
spend at least 99% of cap. In 2013-2020, the league
must spend at least 95% of cap, and individual teams
must spend at least 89% of cap. Four, rookie salaries
are connected to veteran salaries based upon their
pick location and position. Five, league minimum
players receive a $55,000 increase in 2011 and
$15,000 each additional year. Six, a “legacy fund”
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for pre-1993 pensions is created worth $620 million,
with 49% paid by current player revenues and 51%
paid by team owners. Seven, player contracts have a
three-year injury guarantee, and all players qualify
for the NFL medical plan for life. Eight, players
have less practice full-contact. Nine, through 2013,
the regular season is 16 games with four preseason
games, and the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) can veto changes beyond.
Ten, both the league and the union mutually agree to
dispute arbitration over revenue, salary caps, and
free agency.13
In 2015, after being tax-exempt since 1942, the NFL
ends its central league office 501(c)(6) status, which
alleviates both negative “distraction” and publicity.14
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) states, “Section
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for
the exemption of business leagues, chambers of
commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade and
professional football leagues, which are not
organized for profit and no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”15 However, NFL teams,
which are not tax-exempt, already pay taxes,
including on profit, player salaries, and merchandise
sales. While the National Basketball Association
(NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL) still
maintain their status, like MLB, which eliminated its
status in 2007, in return for the nominal taxes the
NFL will pay, the NFL no longer has to file IRS-990
Forms that publicly disclose specific financial
information, including key executive salaries.16
In 2015, the fortunes of the NFL continued to rise.
Relative to 2015 NFL team values, for the ninth
straight year, the Dallas Cowboys maintained the
highest
ranking.17
Forbes
team
valuation
methodology includes,
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Quick huddle: Team values are enterprise values
(equity plus net debt). The values for the Atlanta
Falcons and Minnesota Vikings were adjusted
upward to somewhat reflected [sic] their new
stadiums (the former in 2017, the latter in 2016),
though, as was the case with the 49ers this year,
we will not have a complete handle on the
impact the new stadiums will have until they
finish their first seasons in their new digs. Also,
we did not adjust this year’s values for the San
Diego [Chargers], Oakland Raiders and St.
Louis Rams to reflect the possibility one or
more of these teams will be moving to Los
Angeles because we don’t know who is going.
Revenue and operating income are for the 2014
season, net of revenue sharing and stadium debt
service. Our goal is to measure cash in versus
cash out. The NFL suggested to owners that
they accrue for the cost of the concussion
lawsuit by deducting the entire $27 million cost
per team from profits in 2014. But we omitted
that expense from our operating income figures
because the case is being appealed and the
actual cash outlay for that settlement will be
over several years. Revenue from non-NFL
events is included where applicable. We
gathered our information from the teams, public
documents (for stadium leases and public debt),
sports bankers, credit rating agencies like
Moody’s and Fitch, network executives, and
media experts like SNL Kagan.18
While the Cowboys have not been to the Super Bowl
in over 20 years, owner Jerry Jones and the AT&T
Stadium receive a $4 billion valuation. The
Cowboys generated an American sports team record
revenue of $620 million, while also ranking first in
average NFL attendance (90,000), premium seating
revenue ($120 million) and non-NFL events stadium
revenue ($30 million). After the Cowboys, other big
market teams also playing in team-operated stadiums
encompass the top five team valuations: New
England Patriots ($3.2 billion), Washington
Redskins ($2.85 billion), New York Giants ($2.8
billion) and San Francisco 49ers ($2.7 billion). After
moving into the new $1.2 billion Levi Stadium, in
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18
Ibid.

Number 4 (Fall/Winter 2016-2017) | Missouri Policy Journal | 27

one year, the 49ers valuation increased by 69%, with
team revenue increasing 160%.19 Mike Ozanian,
Forbes, contends,
The NFL’s rising tide has lifted all boats. The
average NFL team is worth $1.97 billion, 38%
more than last year. The gain was fueled by a
$39 million increase in national revenue for
each of the league’s 32 teams. The NFL is
unlike any other sports league in that from an
operating standpoint every team is immensely
profitable. In 2014, operating income (earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization) averaged $76 million for the
league’s 32 teams, ranging from a high of $270
million (Cowboys) to a low of $25 million
(Atlanta Falcons). Even if they don’t play in a
big market or profit from hosting non-NFL
events at their stadium, owners can still make an
obscene amount of money if they consistently
put a top-notch product on the field.20
In 2016, globally, the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys are
also the world’s most valuable team, which is the
first time a non-soccer team has held this ranking.
Overall, out of the existing 32 NFL teams, 27 NFL
team valuations rank in the top 50 globally.21 Forbes
global team valuation results and methodology
include,
The average franchise in the top 50 is worth
$2.2 billion versus $1.75 billion a year ago. The
breakdown by sport is 27 NFL teams (versus 20
last year), seven MLB (versus 12), eight NBA
(versus 10) and eight European soccer (versus
seven). The New York Knicks are the most
valuable NBA team at $3 billion and rank No. 7
overall. No F1, Nascar or hockey teams made
the grade. The minimum to make the cut is up
20% to $1.48 billion (Jacksonville Jaguars).
There are 76 franchises worth at least $1 billion
19
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by our count. Our franchise values are based on
the Forbes valuations done over the past year for
NFL, NHL, NBA, MLB, F1, soccer and Nascar.
Some team values have shifted since our last
published reports, but they are not reflected
here. Most notably, the former St. Louis Rams
relocated to Los Angeles, increasing the team’s
value from our September estimate of $1.46
billion. Forbes’ team values are enterprise
values (equity plus debt) based on current
stadium deals (unless a new stadium is
pending).22
In 2014, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell makes
$34.1 million, including bonuses of $26.5 million. In
nine years, his salary totals $180.5 million,
averaging $20 million per year. While critics call for
his termination based on recent league scandals and
negative publicity, Goodell continues to increase the
profits of the owners. As a result, in 2014,
comparing the NFL revenue to pay of other
professional league commissioners, he may be
underpaid. Goodell’s $34.1 million is only 0.26% of
league revenue compared to other commissioners:
MLB ($26 million -0.33%), NBA ($20 million 0.44%), NHL ($10.5 million - 0.26%), and MLS
($3.5 million - 0.76%).23 Furthermore, in 2016,
recent projections expect NFL revenues to exceed
$13 billion, increasing over 50% from 2010.
Moreover, these projections are over halfway to
Goodell’s goal of $25 billion by 2027. Since
announcing the goal in 2010 when NFL revenues
were $8.5 billion, the NFL annual revenue growth is
$750 million.24 Relative to the increasing bottomline of the NFL continuing, Ozanian declares,
Has the NFL peaked? Don’t make me laugh.
The league is about to build a new stadium near
22
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Los Angeles, one that will be so audacious—the
grandest reality console in the land—that it
could make the one in Dallas seem humble.
That L.A. stadium will make money for
whichever team plays there, but the big picture
is that it will serve as the show biz platform for
the league. Think concerts and entertainment
laden with NFL endorsers such as Hyundai,
Visa and Microsoft. And there is more fantasy
(or is it reality?) TV . . . on the way. Meanwhile,
the Green Bay Packers, a team about as far
away from Hollywood as you can get
(spiritually speaking) are building Titletown
District—a destination area to be created on
approximately 34 acres of land immediately
west of Lambeau Field—to capitalize on their
fanatical fan base.25
St. Louis and the NFL
In 1923, St. Louis briefly has a team entry in the
NFL. Then, in 1934, the Cincinnati Gunners relocate
to St. Louis, playing three games before folding.26
Eventually, St. Louis hosts two additional NFL team
relocations: the St. Louis Cardinals and the St. Louis
Rams.

seasons and attendance, Greg Marecek, sportswriter,
states,
In the 1959 season, the Cards weren’t drawing
in Chicago, so they moved home games to both
Minnesota and to Solider Field in Chicago as
they looked for a new home. The team lost their
last six games, after which Violet Bidwill
decided to pull up the trucks and move the
franchise to St. Louis, where they had some
success in annual charity preseason games.29
In 1960, after the NFL team owners approve the
relocation, the St. Louis Cardinals play their
inaugural season. However, before the approval, St.
Louis is separately courted as both a possible NFL
expansion city and as a rival American Football
League (AFL) city. Ultimately, both the AFL threat
and the preference to have only one Chicago NFL
team results in the relocation.30 On the Cardinals
relocation to St. Louis, Marecek asserts,
St. Louis fans were excited to have a football
team, but while the Baseball Cardinals
welcomed the new team to the city, the problem
that would never really be resolved in twentyeight seasons quickly became apparent. There
was one stadium and two teams, and the
baseball team owned it. The Football Cardinals
would have to schedule early season games on
the road, they couldn’t practice on the field until
baseball ended, and old Sportsman Park, a.k.a.
Busch Stadium, had a fair number of seats with
obstructed views. Another issue was that the
Football Cardinals needed to be differentiated
from the Baseball Cardinals. The football team
was tagged with the moniker “the Big Red,”
which became a catch phrase for fans, players,
and broadcasters alike.31

The Cardinals (1960-1987)
The Cardinals, originally located in Chicago and
now located in Arizona, are one of two existing
teams from the original eleven team Professional
Football Association (1920), which becomes the
NFL in 1922. The other existing team, the Decatur
Staleys, moves to Chicago in 1921 and becomes the
Chicago Bears in 1922. The Chicago Cardinals won
NFL Championships in 1925 and 1947.27 In 1947,
after the death of Charles Bidwill, Sr., his wife,
Violet Bidwill becomes the first NFL female team
owner, eventually marrying Walter Wolfner, who
becomes team managing director, in 1949. In 1951,
Charles Stormy Bidwill becomes team president,
and William (Bill) Bidwill becomes team vicepresident.28 However, after a trend of disappointing
Ozanian, “The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL.”
Greg Marecek, The St. Louis Football Cardinals: A
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27
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In the mid-1980s, the Cardinals threaten to leave St.
Louis unless the city builds the team a new team
stadium with increased seating capacity, specifically
for usage by the Football Cardinals and not the
Baseball Cardinals. In 1987, while Busch Stadium
seating capacity, 54,392, is an NFL low, the
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Baseball Cardinals average attendance (81 games) is
still higher than the Football Cardinals average
attendance (eight games).32 During political wars on
the possible location of the St. Louis stadium, the
Cardinals owner, William Bidwill, rejects a proposal
for a 70,500 seat open air stadium in St. Louis
County.33 Then, in early 1988, through the
negotiations of Gov. John Ashcroft with St. Louis
County Executive Gene McNary and St. Louis
Mayor Vincent Schoemehl, St. Louis promises the
support of downtown stadium construction. The
Missouri General Assembly gives preliminary
approval for a tax supported 70,000 seat stadium
through a new stadium authority. However, after
already courting offers from Baltimore and
Jacksonville, William Bidwell files for relocation to
Phoenix with the NFL.34 The new lease with the
73,000 seat Sun Devil Stadium, at Arizona
University, requires the Cardinals to locate in the
area for a minimum of 10 years, with a team option
up to 30 years, but the team can leave the lease for
new stadium in the Phoenix area. Luxury boxes
would yield about $2.5 million yearly.35 Projections
also include $17 million annually in ticket and
concession incentives.36
On March 15, 1988, the day of the NFL owners
vote, to combat the offer of Arizona, a local St.
Louis civic group makes a last attempt at keeping the
Rams through promises of increasing seating
capacity in Busch Stadium until a new dome stadium
is built. However, after 28 seasons in St. Louis, with
only three playoff game appearances—all on the
road and all losses—the NFL owners reluctantly but
overwhelmingly approve (26 to 2) the Cardinals’
move to Arizona, becoming the Phoenix Cardinals
Don Pierson, “Cardinals Head for Phoenix,” Chicago
Tribune, January 16, 1988, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-0116/sports/8803220953_1_william-bidwill-move-billy-bidwill.
33
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36
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and later (1994) the Arizona Cardinals.37 On the
Cardinals relocation to Arizona, Marecek claims,
What “Mr. B” was absolute on was his loyalty
to his team, his respect for the tradition of the
NFL and his Cardinals, for the bird on the
helmet, and the quality of the game. He was
roasted for leaving St. Louis, yet had the
stadium that was built for the Los Angeles Rams
been promised, the Cardinals still would be in
St. Louis today. His request and requirement of
new digs was the norm and still is in the NFL.38
The Rams (1995-2015)
After the departure of the Cardinals, who would
have stayed for a $90 million public subsidy,39 St.
Louis attempts to secure one of the two 1993 NFL
expansion teams, but, primarily due to issues
establishing a viable local ownership group, St.
Louis is not awarded an expansion team, but
Charlotte and Jacksonville are.40 First, in order to
attract an NFL team, St. Louis decides to build a
new stadium, the Trans World Dome—later renamed
the Edward Jones Dome. The dome is part of the
Cervantes Convention Center to provide additional
exhibition
space
for
attracting
premier
41
conventions, and utilizes the St. Louis Regional
Convention and Sports Complex Authority
(STLRSA).42 On its creation and purpose to the
dome, STLRSA states,
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2010): 482, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl
e=1488&context=sportslaw.
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The Authority was established by enabling State
legislation in May 1989 as an independent
public entity with 11 Commissioners. These
Commissioners are appointed by the State of
Missouri (5), the City of St. Louis (3), and St.
Louis County (3) on a bipartisan basis. The
Authority was established under Mo. Revised
Statutes 67.650 to 67.658 and is empowered to
acquire, purchase or lease, and construct sports
stadiums and do all things incidental and
necessary to facilitate these purposes. This
authority was used to construct what is now the
Edward Jones Dome. In connection with these
activities, the Authority is granted all rights and
powers necessary to plan, finance, construct,
equip and maintain the Facility at the highest
standards.43
As result, STLRSA issues $258 million in 30-year
revenue bonds with payment split 50% Missouri
($12 million yearly), 25% St. Louis County ($6
million yearly), and 25% St. Louis City ($6 million
yearly). Included in the yearly amounts, the State
pays $2 million in maintenance with the City and
County paying $1 million each in maintenance. The
total costs of the bonds are $720 million (State $360 million, County - $180 million and City - $180
million).44 Expanding on the scope of the public
funding and financing, Neil deMause, journalist, and
Joanna Cagan, teacher and writer, proclaim,
The TWA Dome was constructed entirely at
government expense, with $301 million raised
by selling general purpose bonds. That $301
million, plus interest, will be paid back at $24
million a year over thirty years; a boost in the
county hotel tax will pay for about a quarter of
the sum, and the rest will be paid out of the
general city and state treasuries. The 113 luxury
boxes and sixty five hundred club seats will
generate $1.8 million per year in tax subsidies
via the business-entertainment deduction, paid
for by the federal treasury. U.S. taxpayers will
likewise be responsible for an additional $6
million a year in subsidies through the federaltax exemption of the bonds. Trans World
43

Ibid.
Fred W. Lindecke, “Razing to Start Action on Stadium,” St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, January 25, 1992.
44

Airlines agreed to pay $1.3 million a year (plus
inflation) to plaster its name on the dome, nearly
a million of which will go to the Rams. Total
subsidy: $1.07 billion over thirty years.45
Second, in order to secure a NFL team, St. Louis
engages with the Los Angeles Rams. In 1946, the
Rams and their owner, Dan Reeves, relocate to Los
Angeles from their NFL founding city—Cleveland
(1937). In 1972, after the death of Reeves, Robert
Irsay buys the Rams from Reeve’s estate. Then, he
trades ownership with Baltimore Colts owner,
Carroll Rosenbloom. In 1979, Rosenbloom drowns
and his wife, Georgia Frontiere, becomes Rams
owner and the second NFL female team owner.
Frontiere fires her stepson, Steve Rosenbloom (the
team operations manager).46 Rosenbloom contends
his father only gives Frontiere control of the team
due to the widow tax exemption but does not intend
for her to actually run the team.47 In 1980, the Rams
leave the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (opened
1923) to play in the newer (opened 1966) football
retrofitted Anaheim Stadium, home of the California
Angels (MLB).48 Further, in 1982, the Raiders move
from Oakland to Los Angeles, playing in the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum.49 However, the Rams
still sought a newer stadium with more modern
revenue sources. As a result, when Los Angeles,
Anaheim, and Orange County respond unfavorably
to new stadium demands, the Rams look to St.
Louis.50 In securing the relocation of the Rams,
Mark Rosentraub, Professor of Sports Management
and Director of the Center for Sport and Policy at
University of Michigan, writes,

45
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tml.
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To entice the Rams from Anaheim, the city and
county of St. Louis offered the team a
wonderful lease for use of their new dome. The
St. Louis Rams would receive 100 percent of all
concession revenues, 75 percent of advertising
income from the facility, and 90 percent in any
year that more than $6 million in advertising
income was earned. A local corporate group
guaranteed that 85 percent of the luxury boxes
and club seats would be sold for fifteen years
and the Rams could keep all of this income.
Through the sale of seat options to prospective
fans, the city and county of St. Louis also
agreed to provide the funds to pay the team’s
indemnity to Anaheim, all moving expenses,
and the costs associated with building a practice
facility. The Rams received twelve hundred
parking spots for each game at the cost of $2 per
spot as well, and could distribute or sell these as
they desired. For all these incentives or
provisions, the Rams pay an annual rent of
$250,000 and between $250,000 and $300,000
for game day expenses associated with the use
of the facility. There is the potential for the
Rams to ‘cover’ the annual cost of their lease
from the advertising they sell in the stadium
built for them with taxpayer’ funds.51
On January 17, 1995, Georgia Frontiere, originally
from St. Louis, announces the relocation of the
Rams to St. Louis, but NFL team owners decidedly
block the move. However, after litigation threats by
both the Rams and Missouri Attorney General Jay
Nixon, on April 12, 1995, the NFL team owners
approve (23-6-1) Rams relocation to St. Louis,52 the
same year the Los Angeles Raiders also move back
to Oakland.53 In setting new standards for public
sports subsidies, St. Louis got a NFL team, and the
NFL team got record profits.54 On the Rams
relocation to St. Louis, Frontiere exclaims, “St.
Louis is my hometown, and I brought my team here
to start a new dynasty. In my early days, I thought
I’d become a big opera star in Europe. Now, by
51
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bringing the city an NFL team, I’m doing something
that truly will make St. Louis proud. I’ve worked
hard for it.”55
Before the start of 1995-1996 season, the Rams
make the move to the Trans World Dome in the new
St. Louis Convention and Visitor Center (CVC). St.
Louis commits to the CVC before the Rams,
including building the dome during Rams
negotiations. During negotiations, the CVC agrees to
a Rams relocation fee to be paid to the NFL. Upon
agreeing to the relocation, the Rams agree not to sue
the League. However, instead, the CVC sues the
NFL and all member teams, except the Rams,
primarily relative to antitrust claims and the
relocation fee.56
After the disappointing 1995-1996 St. Louis Rams
season of seven wins and nine losses, the CVC files
a $130 million lawsuit against the NFL, with
damages tripled if won, including the following
claims. One, a Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy
claim alleges the NFL Guidelines and Relocation
Policies are illegal and promote collusive action.
Two, a Section 2 monopolization claim alleges the
NFL used its power to gain illegal profits. Three, a
tortious interference claim alleges the NFL
wrongfully denied business advantage to deal with
all NFL teams. However, the judge dismisses the
case and finds in favor of the NFL, which is affirmed
by the Eight District Court in 1998.57 Relative to the
CVC case, Franklin Fisher, Professor of Economics
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
Hubert Mizell, “Weird and Wild Road to Glory,” St.
Petersburg Times, January 23, 2008, accessed September 5,
2016,
http://www.sptimes.com/News/012300/news_pf/Bucs/Weird_a
nd_wild_road_t.shtml.
56
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197-198, accessed September 5, 2016,
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57
Franklin M. Fisher, Christopher Maxwell, and Evan Sue
Schouten, “Sports League Issues: The Relocation of the Los
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2012), 279-280.
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Christopher Maxwell, Vice President at Charles
River Associates, and Evan Sue Schouten, Principal
at Charles River Associates, contend,

RAMS, the CVC, the Authority and SLNFL, the
CVC and the Authority have agreed to (1)
operate, manage, maintain and repair the Dome
to a First Class Standard (as hereinafter defined)
at all times during the term of the Lease and (2)
cause the Dome to meet the First Tier Standard
(as hereinafter defined) on July 31, 2005 and
March 1, 2015. “First Class Standard” means
that the Dome and each component thereof is to
be constructed, operated, maintained and
repaired to a first class, superior or excellent
standard. “First Tier Standard” means that the
Dome and each component thereof must be
among the top 25% of all NFL football stadia
and NFL football facilities, if such NFL football
stadiums and facilities were to be rated or
ranked according to the matter sought to be
measured. If the Dome is not maintained to a
First Class Standard for 60 days following
written notice by the RAMS to the CVC (or 5
days during the NFL season), the RAMS must
first attempt to remedy such condition and offset
the cost thereof against any obligation it has to
the CVC under the Lease, and thereafter may
terminate the Lease or convert the Lease to an
annual term with the RAMS having successive
unilateral annual renewal options thereafter until
March 31, 2025. If the Dome does not meet the
First Tier Standard on July 31, 2005 and again
on March 1, 2015, the RAMS may by written
notice to the CVC convert the Lease to an
annual term with the RAMS having successive
unilateral renewal options thereafter until March
31, 2025.61

The St. Louis CVC claimed that the NFL
relocation policies had caused the city to receive
‘firesale’ lease terms for its stadium or,
equivalently, that the NFL’s relocation policies
had caused the city to greatly ‘overpay’ to get
the Rams. The CVC believed that these policies
had prevented all of the other teams from
negotiating with St. Louis. This belief had little
factual basis, since the CVC failed to contact
any other team beside the Rams regarding
leasing its stadium. It seems more likely,
however, that, to the extent that the CVC’s lease
terms were unfavorable, it was because the city,
itself, had placed itself in a poor bargaining
position by committing to build a stadium prior
to arranging for an NFL tenant.58
In the Rams lease, an “escape hatch” exists. The
lease gives the Rams the ability to move if the dome
is not in the top 25% of NFL stadiums, including
specific components being first tier, on March 1,
2005, or March 1, 2015. The 30-year lease then
becomes a one-year lease. This clause implies
continuous additional public funding is needed to
meet compliance.59 Further, at least 15 components
must be first tier with very little, if any, guidance on
what that status means, resulting in the CVC
eventually creating a $4 million yearly preservation
fund to attempt clause compliance and
maintenance.60 Relative to the lease of the dome to
the Rams, the STLRSA states,
The St. Louis Rams Football Partnership
(“RAMS”), owner of the St. Louis Rams NFL
football team, has certain rights to occupy and
use the Dome through March 31, 2025 under an
Amended and Restated St. Louis NFL Lease
dated January 17, 1995 (the “Lease”) among the
RAMS, the CVC and St. Louis NFL
Corporation (“SLNFL”). Pursuant to Annex 1 to
the Lease dated January 17, 1995 among the
Fisher, Maxwell, Schouten, “Sports Facilities and
Development: The Economics of Sports Leagues,” 198.
59
Rosentraub, Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports
and Who’s Paying For It, 226-227.
60
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To attempt to comply with the first tier/standard
clause for 2005, the CVC and Rams agree to the
improvements of four elements: suite and suite
concourses, club suites, lounges and concourses,
lightning and sound, and the playing field. As a
result, the playing field is temporarily installed for
four years until a new removable turf is agreed upon
for 2010. Further, in the fall of 2007, the two parties
cannot agree on what first-tier status is, so a second
amendment to the lease commits the CVC, Regional
Sports Authority (RSA) and Rams to $30 million in

58
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renovations by 2009. The 13 dome improvements
include two end zone video boards.62 Further, based
upon this lease precedence, other NFL teams with a
similar clause include: Cincinnati Bangals, Kansas
City Chiefs, and San Diego Chargers.63 However,
Kristen Knauf, JD, of University of Marquette Law
School, argues these clauses are unconscionable and
should therefore be unenforceable in contract law,64
warning in 2010,
In some sense, St. Louis’s situation could be
seen as a lesson in contract drafting for other
communities and their professional sports
franchises. However, St. Louis’s agreement to
include the state-of-the-art clause in the lease
should not be construed as giving any kind of
legitimacy to such clauses. Franchise relocation
has historically been one of the biggest
problems that the NFL has had to face. The
victims of franchise relocations are the fans,
cities, taxpayers, and, ultimately, the league
itself. Although there have not been any recent
NFL franchise movements, only time will tell if
state-of-the art clauses are the sparks that ignite
a new fire of NFL franchise movement.65

after opposition, Checketts removes Limbaugh from
his group. By mid-January 2010, Frontiere’s
children narrow to three potential buyers. At the end
of January 2010, the Checketts group adds Gerald J.
Ford, Texas billionaire, as its lead investor at 30%.
By early February 2010, NFL Commissioner
Goodell prefers St. Louis stay an NFL city for the
foreseeable future. By mid-January 2010, Shahid
Khan, Illinois auto parts manufacturer, has an
agreement with the Frontiere children for their 60%
ownership. However, in mid-April 2010, 40% Rams
minority owner, Stan Kroenke, uses his right to first
refusal to purchase the team, claiming he will
attempt to keep the Rams in St. Louis. By late May
2010, Kroenke presents his Rams purchase plans to
the NFL Finance Committee, including how he will
meet the NFL cross-ownership guidelines relative to
his ownership of the Denver Nuggets (NBA) and
Colorado Avalanche (NHL). In mid-August 2010,
Goodell notifies NFL owners of the unanimous
recommendation of Kroenke by the finance
committee. On August 25, 2010, Kroenke is
unanimously approved as the new Rams owner.66
Moreover, on the new Kroenke Rams ownership,
Chip Rosenbloom declares,

In January 2008, after a St. Louis Rams Super Bowl
Championship in 1999, Georgia Frontiere dies, and
her children, Chip Rosenbloom and Lucia
Rodriguez, inherit her 60% Rams ownership, plus
the inheritance tax. In July 2008, the children hire a
firm to handle team ownership offers. In late May
2009, the children hire Goldman Sachs for bid
evaluation and buyer solicitation. In early June 2009,
the St. Louis Blues (NHL) owner, Dave Checketts,
makes official his desire to group purchase the
Rams. In October 2009, Rush Limbaugh, political
commentator (born in Cape Girardeau, MO) decides
to join the Checketts group, but at least a half dozen
potential buyers exist at this point. By mid-October,

Fifteen years ago, my family entered a
partnership with Stan Kroenke and it has been a
wonderful relationship. Although today is an
emotional day and the end of an era for our
family, it is also the beginning of a new chapter
in the rich history of the St. Louis Rams. We
look forward to Stan continuing the great
tradition of the organization. On behalf of my
sister Lucia (Rodriguez) and our entire family,
we congratulate Stan and the Kroenke family on
becoming the majority owner of the Rams.67
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In 1995, after being involved in the 1993 expansion
process as a lead investor,68 during the possible
relocation of the Rams, Stan Kroenke could buy up
to 40% of the Rams, and, as minority owner, had the
option of either leaving the Rams in Anaheim or
moving them to St. Louis. However, he chooses to
move them to St. Louis to increase short term profit
yields, especially relative to the dome.69 In 1995,
Kroenke pays $60 million for a 30% Rams
ownership. Then, in 1998, he pays $20 million for
another 10% Rams ownership, totaling $80 million
spent and 40% ownership obtained.70 Finally, in
2010, Kroenke, the Columbia, MO, billionaire, pays
$450 million for the remaining 60% of the Rams
ownership, which is based upon the team valuation
of $750 million (60% equals $450 million).71 On his
new ownership of the Rams, Kroenke states,

first tier deadline.73 The CVC plan includes
improvements to all 15 first tier components,
featuring: a 50,000-square-foot club and suit
entrance in Baer Plaza that connects the Dome to
Broadway, conversion of the courtyard between the
convention center and the Dome into a pre-game fan
destination, new graphics and lighting throughout
the Dome and a massive center scoreboard.74
Relative to funding these improvements and the
amended lease limitation to first-tier items generally
provided by the NFL franchisee, the CVC argues,
This language limits CVC’s obligation for new
construction or renovations to the extent the
items included in those improvements are
generally paid for by the NFL franchisee in
other stadia. CVC has researched the
franchisees’ contributions to the new stadia built
and/or stadia significantly renovated since the
last measuring date in 2005. This data indicates
that NFL franchisees have been solely
responsible for generally providing (on average)
fifty-two percent (52%) of the costs and expense
of the items included in these stadia projects.
Therefore, CVC is only obligated under the
Amended Lease to undertake and/or provide
funding for forty-eight (48%) of the
improvements in the first-tier proposal that
follows.75

I’m going to attempt to do everything that I can
to keep the Rams in St. Louis. Just as I did
everything that I could to bring the team to St.
Louis in 1995. I believe my actions speak for
themselves. There’s a track record. I’ve always
stepped up for pro football in St. Louis. And I’m
stepping up one more time. I’m born and raised
in Missouri. I’ve been a Missourian for 60
years. People in our state know me. People
know I can be trusted. People know I am an
honorable guy.72
By February 1, 2012, the St. Louis Convention and
Visitors Commission (CVC) provides a preliminary
compliancy plan to the Rams for the March 1, 2015,
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As a result, since the CVC preliminary proposal
improvements total $124 million, the Rams would
be responsible for $64.48 million (52%) and the
CVC responsible for $59.52 million (48%).76 The
Rams must notify the CVC on plan approval by
March 1, 2012.77
On March 1, 2012, the Rams reject the CVC
proposal and submit a counter proposal created by
Knauf, “If You Build It, Will They Stay?” 485.
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HKS Sports and Entertainment, architects. Rams
propose substantial Dome improvements through the
facility seating bowl, patron amenities and support,
NFL and multipurpose facilities, convention
facilities, food service, facility operations,
media/electronic systems, mechanical and electrical,
circulation, miscellaneous (entry drive-up/drop-off,
trash chutes, catwalk, and perimeter security), and
future (“Super Bowl” seating expansion and future
suites).78,79 In order to price the improvements
proposed by the Rams, the CVC hires a construction
firm, which estimates the construction costs at $700
million plus a $500 million loss on conventions
during the estimated three-year renovations.80
Ultimately, the CVC and Rams cannot negotiate an
agreement on the first tier standard, resulting in a
lease default arbitration panel on June 15, 2012.81
Regarding the arbitration panel findings, the CVC
shares,
The CVC and the RAMS have engaged in
arbitration
regarding
the
improvements
necessary to ensure the Dome meets the First
Tier Standard on March 1, 2015. The RAMS
sought a series of improvements estimated to
cost approximately $800 million to $900
million. In February 2013, an arbitration panel
held in favor of the RAMS. The arbitration
panel found that, due to several structural
deficiencies in the size and dimensions of the
Dome (compared to other, newer NFL
stadiums), only the improvements suggested by
the RAMS will meet the First Tier Standard
required by the Lease.82
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In addition, per the ruling, the CVC is also
responsible for the Ram’s $2,013,150 arbitration
fees.83 Further, after the ruling, the CVC announces,
“In July 2013, the CVC announced that it will not
commence the improvements proposed by the
RAMS and discussed in the arbitration panel’s
decision. Accordingly, beginning in March 2015, the
Lease may be converted to an annual term with the
RAMS having successive unilateral renewal options
thereafter as discussed above.”84
In late December 2014, the St. Louis Rams, San
Diego Chargers, and the Oakland Raiders, each with
leases allowing the team to vacate, inform the NFL
that they will not move to Los Angeles and remain
in their current cities in 2015.85 As a result, Missouri
Gov. Jay Nixon believes the St. Louis Rams will
stay through a stadium plan led by his two-man task
force.86 The task force includes Dave Peacock, a
former President of Anheuser-Busch, working with
the NFL on advertising and marketing, and also a
Pro Football Hall of Fame advisory board member
and past-chairman of the St. Louis Sports
Commission. The second member is Robert Blitz, a
founding attorney at Blitz, Bardgett and Deutsch in
St. Louis, who also helped relocate the Rams to St.
Louis and is a former member of and current legal
counsel to the St. Louis Regional Convention and
Sports Complex Authority.87 However, in any
stadium plan, Governor Nixon expects to see six
83
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core principles. One, the project uses land that is
currently in a blighted location and not scheduled for
redevelopment. Two, the land needs to be certified
for environmental clean-up. Three, construction
creates jobs with competitive wages and tries to
utilize materials nearby. Four, the project
incorporates a plan to continue to utilize the Edward
Jones Dome. Five, the stadium is a public asset, not
private. Six, the project creates no new tax burden on
citizens in the local region or state, including no new
tax increase proposals requiring a vote.88 Moreover,
in regards to keeping the Rams, Governor Nixon
declares,
Being an NFL city is a matter of civic and state
pride, and make no mistake about it—St. Louis
is an NFL city. The economic impact of having
an NFL team in St. Louis extends long beyond
Sunday afternoon, and sends a clear signal that
this city is a worldwide player. I am confident
that these two outstanding civic leaders can
explore paths forward that will protect taxpayers
and ensure private investment.89
On January 5, 2015, Stockbridge Capital Group,
owners of a 298-acre Hollywood Park site in
Englewood, California, announces a partnership
between them and Stan Kroenke, Rams Owner, to
build a new NFL stadium for Los Angeles.90
Kroenke recently purchased the 60 acres adjacent to
Hollywood Park and the Forum, previous home of
the Los Angeles Lakers (NBA) and Los Angeles
Kings (NHL) and now renovated music venue. WalMart sold Kroenke the land after not receiving
public approval to build a superstore. Kroenke is a
former Wal-Mart board member and husband to
Anne Walton Kroenke, daughter of Wal-Mart cofounder Bud Walton.91 Further, the stadium is part
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of a larger development project plan (City of
Champions Revitalization Project) that does not use
tax dollars, but includes an 80,000 seat stadium with
a 6,000 seat performance venue and a reconfigured
previously approved Hollywood Park Plan of
890,000 square feet of retail space, 780,000 square
feet of office space, 2,500 residential units, 300 hotel
rooms, and 25 acres of public space.92
On January 9, 2015, Peacock and Blitz announce a
downtown open-air north riverfront stadium, seating
64,000. Above the high-mark of the Mississippi
River, the 90-acre stadium project includes a floating
riverfront trail, boat docks, and 10,000 parking
spaces. The $860 to $985 million cost projections
include $200 million from the NFL loan program,
$250 million from Stan Kroenke, $55 million in
state tax credits, $130 million in personal seat
licenses (PSLs) to fans, and $350 million from bond
extensions on the Edward Jones Dome.93 St. Louis
City owns 22.5 acres out of the total 90 acres (25%),
which includes 33 buildings, mostly vacant, and the
preserved 1902 Power and Light Building.94 In
response to the St. Louis stadium announcement, in
an open letter from Hartford to St. Louis, Dan Haar,
Hartford Courant reporter and columnist, writes,
Don’t Do it! . . . Yes, the glitzy renderings look
like a salvation, where empty lots and crumbling
buildings now stand. But it’s not a touchdown.
It’s a fool’s goal chasing an NFL owner who
doesn’t want to be there, building on land that
could someday redefine St. Louis. . . . But the
risk of spending taxpayer dollars on a new
stadium is hardly the main reason for this
warning. The bigger matter is the feel of the city
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itself, and that’s where we in Hartford can help
our friends in the Show-Me State. Hartford and
St. Louis share a lot—river towns built on
manufacturing, both with a claim to Mark
Twain, both living in the shadow of larger
neighbors, both with priceless historic assets,
both fighting to keep our downtown districts
lively. Sure, you’re more than twice our size
now, far more of a national city, not to mention
a National League city. But that’s the point.
Way back when, Hartford was the Silicon
Valley of America, home of the leading
factories, birthplace of your beloved baseball
National League. . . . In the middle of the
Clinton boom, we lost the big-league hockey
team whose arena had displaced old city blocks.
We invented a “landing” of our own, named
Adriaen’s, in the hopes that it would be like
your Laclede’s. We even waved $374 million in
the face of an NFL owner, offering a downtown,
riverfront stadium—a deal hailed with a
‘Touchdown!’ headline in our newspaper—only
to find ourselves mocked again. That spurning
by Patriots’ owner Bob Kraft was a good thing.
We built a college football stadium across the
river. We’re restocking downtown with smaller
companies, arts and culture, and, mostly, new
apartments in old buildings. Slowly, it’s
working. You’re way ahead of us, St. Louis.
You have the critical mass. You have the Arch.
You have the Cardinals and the Blues. You
already have a football dome downtown, just 20
years old and now apparently worthless. Don’t
build another one on your last great stretch of
riverfront for just eight big games a year. Those
crumbling industrial buildings on the site—the
collection, not just the best one—could form the
core of a lively, waterfront district, 365 days a
year.95
On January 26, 2015, the Rams send the St. Louis
Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC) official
notice of their lease conversion to annual tenancy,
which begins April 1, 2015, and ends March 31,
Dan Haar, “An Open Letter From Hartford to St. Louis:
Don’t Do It!,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 14, 2015,
accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.courant.com/business/dan-haar/hc-haar-letterhartford-st-louis-downtown-stadium-20150114-story.html.
95

2016.96 As a result, the chairman of the CVC,
Andrew Leonard, believes only a “spectacular
effort” will keep the Rams since they would rather
be in LA.97
In late February 2015, the San Diego Chargers and
Oakland Raiders propose a joint $1.7 billion stadium
on 168 acres in Carson, California. Even though
each team continues to pursue public subsidies and a
new stadium in their home markets, the privately
financed LA joint venture serves as a back-up plan.
The New York Jets and New York Giants are the
only teams that currently play in the same stadium,
MetLife Stadium, which is part of the Meadowlands
Sports Complex in East Rutherford, New Jersey.
While the Chargers and Raiders have been seeking
stadium subsidy solutions for 14 years and six years
respectively, the LA market presents a unique
private stadium opportunity with its massive revenue
potential and ability to increase the value of a
franchise substantially. Moreover, like the Rams and
Raiders, the Chargers previously located in LA and
played at the Memorial Coliseum as the Los Angeles
Chargers, but only for their inaugural season in the
American Football League (AFL) in 1960 before
relocating to San Diego in 1961.98
In early April 2015, Governor Nixon decides to
eliminate St. Louis County taxpayers from the new
NFL stadium financing plan, removing their $6
Kevin Demoff, “Re: Section 16(e)(i) Notice to Convert to
Annual Tenancy,” St. Louis Rams, LLC., January 26, 2015,
accessed September 5, 2016,
http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/c
ontent/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/9/be/9bef49d8-371d-546593d2-69e1fddce864/54c6c8d6122e6.pdf.pdf.
97
David Hunn, “‘Spectacular Effort’ Would be Needed to
Keep Rams, CVC Chairman Says,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
January 28, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-andpolitics/spectacular-effort-would-be-needed-to-keep-rams-cvcchairman/article_22d31c15-4b3d-58f6-a69adc9880358d88.html.
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LA Stadium,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 2015, accessed
September 5, 2016,
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million a year contribution. Regardless, St. Louis
County Executive, Steve Stenger, would only
support county tax dollars through a public vote
anyway. Further, opponents of public stadium
funding continue to argue against the stadium plan
based upon existing laws in both the county and the
city.99

We represent Mr. William White, a City
resident and taxpayer. Mr. White likes the St.
Louis Rams and enjoys football generally.
However, as a formerly homeless individual, he
wants to ensure that the City complies with its
own City Code before it commits to using an
enormous amount of public funding for the
proposed Stadium Project on the North St. Louis
riverfront, the project intended for use by an
NFL team. . . . The City’s Code is nearly
identical to the St. Louis County Charter
provision, Section 11.160 through Section
11.180. St. Louis County Executive Steve
Stenger has stated that public spending on a new
stadium would require a public hearing and a
vote. Surely, the City would also need public
hearing and vote before it could provide
financial assistance to the stadium. . . . It would
appear that the Stadium Project will not move
forward without financial assistance from the
City. The longer the City waits before
complying with Section 3.91 of the City Code,
the greater the urgency for Mr. White to bring
legal action to ensure the City complies. If we
do not receive a response from you that the City
has begun compliance with Chapter. 3.91 by
April 12, we will advise Mr. White to take all
appropriate legal action. Thank you for your
consideration, and we look forward to the fiscal
note, public hearing, and public vote that will
allow the community to decide the priorities it
wants to fund.104

In May 2001, Fred Lindecke, retired political
reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and
Jeannette Mott Oxford, grassroots coordinator and
future State Representative (D-St. Louis City), form
the Coalition Against Public Stadium Funding. The
group encompasses members from all parties and
backgrounds, united by their opposition against
wasting public funding on assisting millionaires in
building stadiums.100 As a result, on November 5,
2002, a Coalition Against Public Funding for
Stadiums referendum passes (55% to 45%), which
affects all future professional sport facility public
funding.101 Further, on November 2, 2004, the
similar St. Louis County charter amendment,
Proposition A, passes (72% to 28%).102
On April 6, 2015, St. Louis University School of
Law Professor and Attorney at Law, John J.
Ammann, and three of his student attorneys, Zachary
Merkle, Maria DeFer and Erica Mazzotti, send a
demand letter to Mr. Winston Calvert, St. Louis City
Counselor on behalf of their client, Mr. William
White.103 Ammann demands,

David Hunn and Steve Giegerish, “Nixon Pulls St. Louis
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In late May 2015, in response to the possible
Raiders/Chargers dual Los Angeles NFL stadium,
San Diego Mayor Kevin Faulconer and his stadium
planning committee announce plans for a $1.1
billion stadium that will not increase taxes.
However, in this plan, the Chargers and the NFL are
accountable for only $500 million total. The plan
includes: $173 million in bonds, $121 million from
San Diego, $121 million from San Diego County,
$100 million from ticket surcharges and personal
seat licenses, and a city contribution of $225 million
from the projected development sale of the current
Qualcomm Stadium site. The Chargers would pay $1
million per game rent, so at least $8 million annually
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in rent plus possible playoff game rent.105 Regarding
the San Diego stadium proposal, Michael Hiltzik,
Los Angeles Times Columnist, argues,
San Diego has a right to be appalled. It doesn’t
have a right to be surprised. This is how the
NFL and its teams operate when they’re trying
to get themselves a new stadium. To their
incumbent cities, they dangle their interest in
staying on a string; to wanna-be cities, they
dangle their interest in relocating. The city of
Carson, which is hoping to become the
Chargers’ new home, should sign up for San
Diego’s correspondence course in surviving the
NFL. Oh, sure, the Chargers say their discontent
with the San Diego offer stems from
Faulconer’s plans to hold a city-only taxpayer
vote despite the original financing proposal.
(There are no plans for a vote by county
taxpayers, who would be on the hook for at least
$121 million.) . . . The fed-up civic leaders see
this as mere pretext. They would be totally
within their rights to conjecture that if the
Chargers really wanted to stay in San Diego—
and if the taxpayers put up more money—they’d
find a way to do so. The reality is that the
Chargers have a free path to leaving San Diego.
That’s the consequence of a sweetheart deal the
community granted the team that has
allowed them to break their lease without
consequences every year since 2007. They’ve
stayed, at considerable cost to San Diego, which
has had to pay for the upkeep of Qualcomm
Stadium. Unless you believe that the Chargers,
who have appeared in one Super Bowl in their
history (and lost), bring some glitter to San
Diego that translates into economic gain, the
Chargers have been a deadweight loss to the
community. Indeed, given its existing drivers of
economic growth, including tourism, high-tech
industry and the military, San Diego is the very
model of a place that doesn’t need the NFL.
That hasn’t kept the team from swanking around
as though San Diego might cease to exist
Jason Notte, “Opinion: San Diego is About to Get Hosed by
the Chargers and the NFL,” MarketWatch, May 22, 2015,
accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/san-diego-is-about-to-gethosed-by-the-chargers-and-the-nfl-2015-05-22.
105

without it. The Chargers’ treatment of the
community is nothing short of contemptuous.106
In late June 2015, City Budget Director Paul Payne
expresses serious concerns with the Rams tax
revenues not covering existing stadium debt. He
claims the $8.5 million raised annually through the
St. Louis City hotel-motel tax does not cover
existing stadium debt, but instead covers part of the
$17.7 million annual debt of the south wing of the
convention center. Further, Payne contends the
Rams generate $4.2 million annually through ticket
sales, payroll, concession, etc., which is only twothirds of the $6 million annually paid by the city on
the stadium debt and maintenance. Overall, the two
taxes dedicated to the convention center and stadium
debt, 3.5% hotel tax and 1% restaurant tax, generate
less than $15 million annually towards the combined
$23.5 million debt payments. Moreover, he adds the
current stadium actually prevents the city from
securing conventions.107
In early July 2015, NFL market data reveals St.
Louis fans will generally support a new stadium,
especially through a willingness to pay for new
PSLs. The one-time seat licenses, required for
annual season tickets, project revenue of $500 to
$40,000 each, totaling $200 million towards the new
stadium. However, the data also reveals NFL
concerns. One, while fans and corporations initially
supported the Rams after their move from Los
Angeles through season ticket purchases, the season
ticket purchases and support declined as the Rams
continued to lose. Two, Rams average season ticket
prices rank 22nd, 28th in average club seat price, and
fourth-lowest in average annual attendance the last
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five years. Three, the Rams are second in team
popularity to the Cardinals.108

The people voted. And now the judge has said
forget all that. It makes me angry. The law is as
clear and straightforward as you can get. It
covers every kind of technique known to man
for getting into the taxpayer’s pocket. And it
says very clearly, without ambiguity, that people
have a right to vote before any of their tax
money is used to build a stadium. I would hope
that someone in city government would be as
upset as I am, and would try to do something
about it.112

In early August 2015, Missouri Circuit Court Judge
Thomas Frawley declares the St. Louis City
ordinance requiring a public vote invalid, while also
finding the new proposed riverfront stadium be
located “adjacent” to the convention center.109 In the
34-page court ruling, Judge Thomas writes,
It is clear the intent of the Ordinance is to
provide the voters of the City of St. Louis with
authority to approve the City’s financial
assistance to development of a new professional
sports facility. However, the fatal flaw in the
Ordinance is not in what it says but in what it
doesn’t say. Therefore, to render the Ordinance
valid, the Court must add to, not strike from, the
Ordinance
to
cure
its
vagueness.
Notwithstanding the severability clause of the
Ordinance, the Court is not justified in
‘rewriting the Ordinance’ even if the Court
somehow could be sure that this is what the
legislature would have done.110

In mid-August 2015, the Missouri Development
Finance Board (MDFB) approves $15 million in
state tax credits for the new NFL stadium, which
would increase to $50 million over three years.113 At
this point, Mayor Francis Slay contends a St. Louis
City public vote is not needed relative to stadium
public funding nor will he call for one, especially
after a judge invalidates the St. Louis City
ordinance.114 Relative to keeping the Rams, Mayor
Slay conveys,
Having an NFL team in a city is really, I think, a
huge amenity. It’s one of the things that make
living in a big city fun. I’m not going to sit here
and say that we can prove that money going into
this—that we’re going to get out, in dollars and
cents, what we’re putting into it. But I do think
it’s a good investment in the city and its future.
People like NFL football. They want a team that
they can support, whether they go to the games
or not. It has a lot to do with big-city pride. We
need leadership. And I believe very strongly that
people want a football team. I think it’s time to
step up, take a position, and lead. And that’s
what I’m doing.115

Further, while St. Louis City public officials,
especially the mayor’s office, consider the options
relative to still conducting a public vote on the
stadium funding,111 Fred Lindecke, Coalition
Against Public Stadium Funding co-founder,
advocates,
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In early September 2015, longtime St. Louisans Dan
Dierdorf and Joe Buck continue to vent their
frustration with the ongoing Rams saga, particularly
with Stan Kroenke.116 Dierdorf is a St. Louis
Cardinals Football Hall of Famer, former NFL
broadcaster117, and former CVC Chairman.118 Buck
is a lead NFL broadcaster, MLB broadcaster, and
son of legendary baseball announcer and St. Louis
Cardinals Hall of Famer, Jack Buck.119 Relative to
the Rams staying in St. Louis, Buck declares,
I think it’s also the team’s responsibility. And
this team has been terrible. It’s always a new
year with the same result. I think that’s asking a
lot of an average fan to get excited about going
to a game when they can sit at home and get it
on high definition. . . . Your team has got to be
competitive and dynamic. They don’t even have
anyone they can put on a billboard right now. . .
. There is not enough happening here, and to
become a non-NFL city is frightening.120
Dierdorf adds,
I wish the Rams would have tried harder to be
part of the community, and extended more of an
effort over the years that they’ve been here,
especially when we have an owner who won’t
even talk to a city who gives him so much. And
when you see a man like Kroenke whose net
Christine Byers, “Buck, Dierdorf Blast Kroenke During
Police Fundraiser,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 9,
2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
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worth is something like $15 billion, that’s a hard
sell. Wouldn’t you love for Stan to say
something? I like him, but I think he dropped
the ball on this one. We deserve to be treated
better than we have been treated.121
In early October 2015, the new proposed stadium
becomes National Car Rental Field. The 20-year
naming rights deal is worth $7.9 million yearly,
totaling $158 million.122 The Missouri Department
of Economic Development (DED) also authorizes
$43,279,563 in Brownfield Tax Credits, which are
eligible
to
environmental
improvement
developments.123 At the same time, NFL owners
approve Kroenke’s professional sports crossownership, which maintains his Rams ownership
and transfers both Denver Nuggets (NBA) and
Colorado Avalanche (NHL) ownership to his wife,
Anne Walton Kroenke. The NBA and NHL team
operations become the responsibility of his son, Josh
Kroenke.124
On October 27, 2015, St. Louis Rams citizens,
primarily fans, plead their case to NFL executives at
a public hearing held at the Peabody Opera House.
The same hearings occur in San Diego on October
28, 2015, and in Oakland on October 29, 2015. NFL
relocation guidelines, the same guidelines citizens
question and express frustration with throughout the
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public hearings,
hearings.125

actually

require

the

public

On November 11, 2015, in New York City, St.
Louis, along with San Diego and Oakland, present
their cases to the NFL’s Los Angeles, stadium and
finance committees for keeping their teams and
avoiding relocation to Los Angeles. Each team
presentation lasts for 45 minutes plus question and
answer. The St. Louis meeting lasts approximately
two hours, which also includes St. Louis Rams
officials. Kroenke does not ask the presenters any
questions.126 Relative to the presentation, presenter
Dave Peacock shares,
I doubt our presentation could have gone much
better. The owners and league officials in the
meeting were generous with their time and
thoughts on our stadium proposal, and for that
we are extremely appreciative. As anticipated,
we were asked a lot of good questions, and there
is no question we had the right team in the room
to respond on behalf of St. Louis.127
In late November 2015, St. Louis Comptroller
Darlene Green announces that she opposes the
stadium financing plan put forth to the Board of
Alderman, which “is not fiscally responsible.” She is
primarily concerned with the plan creating a funding
shortage for St. Louis City, which could hurt the city
credit rating. If the bill is passed, she proposes
Missouri creates a state sports authority for stadium
financing and/or the city partner with regional
businesses for additional funding. Along with Mayor
Francis Slay and Board of Alderman President
Lewis Reed, Green is a member of the three-person
Board of Estimate and Apportionment, which
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approves real estate,
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and
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On December 3, 2015, Dave Peacock, as a guest
columnist, writes a piece for the St. Louis American,
a weekly newspaper serving the African-American
community, advocating for the new stadium and the
future of St. Louis. He contends the stadium
proposal financing does not put the St. Louis City
credit at risk, and is simply a continuation of the $6
million a year already paid to the current stadium
plus two thirds of new stadium tax generation. The
city is only 15% of the total project funding since
$850 million in funding comes from sources outside
the city. The total funding creates 3,000 construction
jobs and 2,600 part-time game-day jobs. Further,
relative to minorities and the inclusion plan, two
objectives exist: “any minority firm involved must
come out as strong, or stronger, at the conclusion of
the project; and we must create careers, not jobs, for
minorities.”129 As a result, this project creates 800
minority city jobs, resulting in $120-$140 million in
minority wages through minority-owned firms.130
Relative to the inclusion plan and the overall
stadium plan, Peacock concludes,
We have offered to the Board of Aldermen an
opportunity to improve the plan and make it an
amendment to the financing bill to further
enhance the effectiveness of the program. Colin
Powell has said that optimism is a force
multiplier. It is up to us to change our future. A
football stadium will not itself make changes for
everyone, but $3 billion spent on development
in our downtown and North City—with an
aggressive minority inclusion plan and effective
oversight—can help change lives. It is up to us
to make prudent decisions, fueled by forwardStaff Reports, “St. Louis Comptroller to Oppose Stadium
Financing Bill,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 21, 2015,
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thinking optimism, and recognize that it is the
sum of many parts that make a city great.131
On December 4, 2015, based upon the
recommendations of the Committee on Los Angeles
Opportunities, the NFL sends a deadline letter to the
St. Louis stadium taskforce. The letter reminds them
that teams can file for relocation starting January 4,
2016, so a special meeting of team owners will be
held on January 12 and 13 to consider applicable
applications. As a result, for complete consideration
of the possible team relocation requests to Los
Angeles, all cities, including St. Louis, must submit
their non-relocation proposals by Wednesday,
December 30, 2015.132 Relative to the specific
proposal requirements, Eric P. Grubman, NFL
Executive Vice President, writes,
The Committee would like to ensure that the
membership has the most current and complete
information to inform those discussions and
therefore invites you to provide, in writing, your
proposal to the club (including any
modifications from your last proposal) for
consideration by the Committee and
membership. We request that the proposal
include, to the extent possible, (i) a detailed
outline of all material terms, financial and
otherwise, (ii) specific details of the sources and
uses for project construction, (iii) identification
of the authority necessary to secure public
contributions (including approvals already
received, and projected timing of obtaining an
additional approvals), and (iv) the timing and
steps necessary, and remaining risks, if any, for
you to execute the deal on the terms outlined.133
On Thursday, December 10, the nine-person St.
Louis Ways and Means Committee votes 7-2 to
move the Stadium Bill (Board Bill 219) to the 28-
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member Board of Alderman.134 After the vote, St.
Louis Alderwoman Megan Ellyia Green, stadium
public funding opponent, alleges “corruption” at
City Hall via Twitter. She claims she “had loved
ones offered bribes for my support” and “I’m not
alone.”135 On December 14, 2015, Board of
Alderman President Lewis Reed considers possible
reprimands relative to Green’s stadium statements,
which he believes “she clearly has lied about
this.”136 The reprimands could include a formal
resolution by the board admonishing her comments
and/or dismissal from subcommittees. Further,
according to St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson, he
and the FBI found the allegations unsubstantive,
resulting in no criminal investigations by either the
FBI or St. Louis Police Department.137 Through a
statement, Green states she did “what I’d expect of
any representative of the people to do. I’d hoped that
I would be taken seriously even if there is not legally
actionable evidence of corruption or bribery.”138
On December 14, 2015, the Editorial Board of the
Kansas City Star expresses concerns about the
legislative approach used by Gov. Jay Nixon on the
St. Louis stadium proposal. Not only is the Missouri
General Assembly opposed to state authorization of
funds without legislative approval or a public vote,
but the proposed St. Louis stadium funding is
significantly more than the $50 in tax credits
Missouri granted Jackson County to renovate
Nicolas J.C. Pistor, “St. Louis Stadium Proposal Gets
Crucial Backing From Aldermanic Committee,” St. Louis PostDispatch, December 10, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
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Arrowhead (NFL) and Kauffman (MLB) stadiums.
Local taxpayers paid for 80% of the $575 million in
stadium upgrades.139 The Kansas City Star Editorial
Board writes,
It’s reasonable for Missourians on the west side
of the state to ask what services might have to
be sacrificed in an already stretched budget to
pay for bond payments and tax credits for a new
St. Louis stadium. Nixon, along with some city
and statewide business leaders, contends that all
efforts should be made to preserve St. Louis’
standing as an NFL city. A new stadium would
revive a downtrodden area of the city and create
a bonanza of temporary and permanent jobs, the
governor claims. Indeed, there may be a case to
be made for a new stadium. But Nixon should
have done more to make it to lawmakers. His
insistence on barging forward without a serious
effort to overcome legislative resistance might
have created an unmovable obstacle.140
On December 15, 2015, after five hours of debate,
the Board of Aldermen approve (17-10) the Stadium
Bill141 despite last minute changes. The NFL now
pledges an additional $100 million toward stadium
construction—$300 million total, but St. Louis City
now rebates back all ticket taxes ($3 million yearly
projection) to the Rams or another NFL tenant. Plus,
the football team now pays rent of $1.5 million
yearly instead of $700,000, which helps support
construction bonds. Further, last month, the stadium
task force redirected the $8 million-dollar annual
stadium naming rights to the team, totaling $158
million. The final vote on of the Stadium Bill occurs
December 18, 2015, and requires a 15-vote
approval.142
Editorial Board, “Gov. Nixon’s Go-It-Alone Approach
Wrong Way on St. Louis Stadium Deal,” Kansas City Star,
December 14, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/article49755080.
html.
140
Ibid.
141
“Board Bill #219,” St. Louis Board of Alderman, December
15, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/c
ontent/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/3/0d/30dc6370-95f0-55b6a7bb-39683e59027d/567058a8cc414.pdf.pdf.
142
David Hunn and Nicolas J.C. Pistor, “St. Louis Aldermen
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On December 16, 2015, the St. Louis Board of
Estimate and Apportionment approve the Stadium
Bill with a vote of 2 to 1. Aldermanic President
Lewis Reed and Mayor Francis Slay votes yes, and
Comptroller Darlene Green votes no. Green does not
find the deal to be fiscally responsible.143
On December 19, 2015, the Board of Aldermen
passes (17-10) the Stadium Bill. However, NFL
Commissioner Goodell warns that the NFL only
assists teams in new stadium construction with a
maximum of $200 million, not the $300 million
factored into the bill financing.144 Aldermanic
President Lewis Reed advocates, “Passage of this
financing proposal keeps us in the running for a
billion-dollar investment on our riverfront and the
job opportunities that would come with it. If the
NFL approves and Kroenke does not, it could at the
least prevent relocation of the team and the tax
revenue it creates.”145
By December 30, 2015, St. Louis, San Diego, and
Oakland provide submissions on team nonrelocation and new stadium viability for NFL
consideration. While Oakland did not submit a
formal proposal, a letter outlines the city’s market
strength and stadium concepts.146 San Diego
provides a 41-page letter,147 which outlines a
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previously released proposal to fund a $1.1 billion
new stadium through a city and county total
contribution of $350 million—pending a public
vote.148
The St. Louis submission is 400 pages, which
includes: financial term sheet, St. Louis City
Stadium Bill and financing plan, details of Missouri
tax credits, architectural designs, letters of support,
market data, and land acquisition.149 David Hunn, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch journalist, shares,
The financing plan is largely unchanged from
that proposed to city aldermen two weeks ago.
But it spells out a few key specifics: The new
stadium could expand to accommodate up to
72,000 seats for events such as a Super Bowl,
10,000 more than normal game-day operations.
The public stadium authority would cooperate
with the Rams on stadium design. And the new
plan spells out that the Rams would get all
stadium revenue, including naming rights—but
would pay all stadium operating and capital
expenses.150
Further, the proposed sources and uses of funds total
$1,110,400,000. First, sources of funds are broken
down into net private sources and net public sources.
One, net private sources ($550,000,000) include:
NFL team ownership ($250,000,000) and NFL G4
Program ($300,000,000). Second, net public sources
($560,400,000) which are contingent upon private
sources, include: State/RSA public bonds proceeds
($226,300,000), City project bond proceeds
($70,400,000), Brownfields Tax Credits proceeds
($41,100,000), MDFB contribution tax credits
proceeds ($47,500,000), RSA funds spent to date
($14,700,000), and proceeds from sale of seat
licenses ($160,400,000). Second, proposed uses of
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2662195/SanDiego-s-letter-to-NFL-committee.pdf.
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funds
includes:
stadium
construction
($917,900,000), site and riverfront development
($76,500,000), parking construction—garage only
($24,800,000), land acquisition ($53,000,000), site
clearing and remediation ($17,600,000), and
relocations ($20,600,000). Note, these sources and
figures do not include the St. Louis City amusement
tax rebate (present value of $65 million), which is
rebated annually to assist in rent and operating and
capital expenses.151
On January 4, 2016, the Rams, Chargers, and
Raiders all officially apply for Los Angeles
relocation to the NFL.152 The Rams 29-page
relocation application proposal argues its case
through three key reasons: first, “the Rams
Inglewood, California project provides the league
with the best opportunity for success in Los
Angeles;” secondly, “the Rams have a contract right
to relocate from St. Louis;” and thirdly, “relocating
the Rams from St. Louis to Los Angeles will
strengthen the league.”153 In particular, relative to St.
Louis, the proposal contends both San Diego and
Oakland are significantly better markets, St. Louis
cannot support three professional teams, financial
team investments have not improved the market
financial performance, and relocation of the Rams
supports tradition and does not require NFL division
realignment.154 Relative to the Rams relocation
proposal, Sam Farmer and Nathan Fenno, Los
Angeles Times reporters, state,
“St. Louis Rams NFL Stadium Project Proposal Summary:
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The Rams envision the stadium forming the hub
of NFL activity on the West Coast. It includes
the stadium—which would be nearly 3 million
square feet—hosting the combine and Pro Bowl.
The neighboring performance venue could be
home to the NFL draft, NFL Honors and other
league-themed events such as NFL Films
premieres. Some of the office space in the
planned mixed-use development around the
stadium could accommodate the NFL Network,
NFL Media and NFL Digital, allowing them
‘dynamic new space just three miles from their
current Culver City location.’155
On January 6, 2016, in response to the Rams
relocation application, Mayor Slay writes a letter to
Commissioner Goodell, primarily concerning the
inaccuracies and misrepresentation of St. Louis and
the Rams. First, Slay, who has been mayor since
2001, points out that the Rams have not attempted in
good faith to achieve a St. Louis stadium solution
since 2002, including the fact that he has not even
met Kroenke, much less had a discussion with him.
Second, Slay argues the viability of the St. Louis
market, which includes: headquarters of six of the
largest U.S. private companies, 19 Fortune 1000
headquarters, and rank of 20th in U.S. metropolitan
areas for both total employment and total personal
income. St. Louis also ranks 20th out of 32 NFL
markets in employment and personal income,
similarity in NFL media markets, and cost of living
is much lower than the average NFL market—
increases purchasing power.156 Slay offers,
As a lifelong St. Louis resident and 30-year
public servant, I can assure you that St. Louis is
a nationally recognized sports town. Our
business community is strong and bright, and I
always stand ready to engage with the
leadership of any business or venture to ensure
that they can prosper and take full advantage of
Sam Farmer and Nathan Fenno, “St. Louis Rams’
Relocation Bid Contends They Have the Best Plan for L.A. and
NFL,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2016, accessed
September 5, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-spnfl-rams-relocation-plan-20160105-story.html.
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everything our market has to offer. To that
point, I have been and will always be ready and
willing to engage with Stan Kroenke to forge
the best possible future for the Rams and the
NFL here in St. Louis. I would welcome the
opportunity to discuss this matter in more detail.
While I remain extremely unhappy at the
portrayal of St. Louis in the Rams’ relocation
submission, I am hopeful—if not confident—
that the NFL will do the right thing.157
On January 7, 2016, the CVC St. Louis NFL
Stadium Task Force sends a letter to the NFL and all
team owners disputing the Rams relocation
application claims
through three primary
responses.158 One, the new St. Louis stadium
proposal is viable and financially attractive to both
the Rams and NFL. Two, the Rams make false
claims relative to the lease, arbitration, and their
impact on relocation. Three, the St. Louis market is
strong and viable relative to three professional
teams.159 The CVC St. Louis NFL Stadium Task
Force concludes,
We were not prepared, however, for the cruel
attack and false claims made by our local team
owner, to his League peers, in an attempt to
punish and embarrass St. Louis—a city whose
residents and businesses have loyally supported
the Rams for more than two decades. No matter
the justification for relocation—and the
falsehoods in the Statement of Reasons strongly
suggest the Rams have no justification to vacate
St. Louis—the style in which their point was
made was unprecedented, personal, groundless
and unbecoming of a steward representing what
we feel is the greatest professional sports league
157
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in the world. But, we want to assure the NFL of
this: St. Louis can, and will, work with Stan
Kroenke. No irreparable harm has been done to
our relationship or the potential to forge a true
partnership that will serve the NFL, the Rams
and St. Louis for decades to come. St. Louis is
an NFL town. It is home to the St. Louis Rams
and our team owner is Mr. Kroenke. We look
forward to the next chapter and sincerely
appreciate you taking the time to consider our
response.160
On January 22, 2016, after a first vote (20-12) fails
to get the necessary three-fourths approvals, the NFL
owners approve (30-2) the relocation of the Rams
from St. Louis to Los Angeles.161 Further, relative to
the NFL resolution,162 after over 10 hours of
presentations and negotiations, the owners also agree
to allow the San Diego Chargers to relocate.
However, the relocation is not to the Carson,
California, joint stadium with the Oakland Raiders,
but instead as a tenant in the Ram’s Inglewood
stadium. If San Diego declines this option, the
Raiders can then consider this option. In addition,
the Rams and any other team moving to LA pay a
$550 million relocation fee. Moreover, if either the
Chargers or Raiders stay in their current hometown,
the NFL promises an additional $100 million, so
$300 million total, towards new stadium
construction costs.163 Relative to the Rams
relocation
decision,
Commissioner
Goodell
exclaims, “We have the return of the Los Angeles
Rams to their home. We have a facility that is going
to be absolutely extraordinary in the Los Angeles
market that I think fans are going to absolutely love.
And I think it’s going to set a new bar for all sports,

quite frankly. And, that, we’re very proud of.”164
Kroenke adds, “It truly is bittersweet. I grew up in
Missouri, and there’s a lot of wonderful people in St.
Louis and Missouri. I’ll always feel that way about
Missouri. I never dreamed I’d be put in this position.
But at the same time, you’re not going to sit there
and be a victim.”165
Upon the relocation, the Rams instantly double in
value to nearly $3 billion, ranking the team as not
only one of the most valuable in the NFL but
globally in professional sports. In September 2015,
Forbes values the Rams at $1.45 billion, ranking
28th out of 32 NFL teams.166 Relative to the Rams
valuation, Michael Ozanian, Forbes’s Executive
Editor, contends,
That valuation incorporated the fact they were
portable. We didn’t know they were going to
Los Angeles specifically but we knew they were
portable. That value assumed they had the
ability to leave. It doubles the value of the team.
The stadium is like a giant video console being
plopped down in L.A. I don’t believe the biggest
challenge is ‘how do I sell tickets?’ it’s ‘how do
I market suites and hospitality when I have two
different teams from outside markets?’ That’s
never been done before. Here in New York you
have the Giants and Jets sharing a stadium but
they were both entrenched franchises that have
been here for years, so you knew who their core
fan bases were. Now you have two outside fan
bases coming in to share a stadium.167
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Further, in 2016, Forbes ranks Rams Owner Stanley
Kroenke the richest person in Missouri168 and 148th
in the world’s billionaires with $7.7 billion in net
worth.169 Forbes states,
Stan Kroenke took the NFL back to Los
Angeles—and made hundreds of millions of
dollars in the process. In August 2016 the Rams
resumed playing in the city, which was the
team’s home for nearly five decades before they
moved to St. Louis in 1995. Thanks to the
massive Los Angeles market, Forbes estimates
the value of the Rams jumped nearly $700
million in a single year. But Kroenke reportedly
agreed to transfer two Denver sports franchises,
the NBA’s Nuggets and NHL’s Avalanche—
worth more than $1.2 billion—to his wife, WalMart heiress and fellow billionaire Ann Walton
Kroenke, as part of the move. NFL rules
prohibit team owners from holding major sports
teams in other NFL cities. Kroenke’s sports
empire still includes a majority stake in English
soccer club Arsenal and the MLS’ Colorado
Rapids. He also oversees a real estate portfolio
believed to include more than 30 million square
feet—much of it shopping plazas near Wal-Mart
stores throughout the United States—and nearly
two million acres of ranches across the U.S. and
Canada. In February 2016 he bought the
massive Waggoner Ranch, which spans nearly
800 square miles in Texas near the Oklahoma
border.170

St. Louis and No NFL
While the Chargers primarily consider their options
in San Diego and Los Angeles and the Raiders
primarily consider their options in Oakland and Las
Vegas, according to regional leader consensus, St.
Louis is done with the NFL.171 Relative to the NFL,
“The Richest Person in Every State—Missouri,” Forbes,
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David Hunn, “Consensus Among Regional Leaders: St.
Louis is Done With Professional Football,” St. Louis Post168

Mayor Slay claims, “They were not being truthful.
And they knew we were putting a lot of energy into
this. We were being led on.”172 However, according
to Commissioner Goodell, the NFL is not done with
St. Louis.173 Relative to points made to Governor
Nixon, Goodell contends,
We have a tremendous number of fans there, as
you know. It’s a great community and if there’s
something that can be worked out and we can
develop a stadium that can allow a team to be
successful there, that’s something we should
consider. I told him when things settle down and
you’re prepared, let’s talk about the future of
NFL football in St. Louis.174
Instead of the NFL, St. Louis is now engaging with
Major League Soccer (MLS). On January 22, 2016,
the MLS Commissioner Donald Garber sends a
letter to Mayor Slay expressing his condolences for
loss of the Rams, but reaffirming his commitment to
help bring MLS to St. Louis through a viable
stadium solution.175 Garber conveys, “Like all local
sports fans, I was both surprised (and disappointed)
with the news of the Rams leaving St. Louis. I
thought that your comments after the announcement
were very appropriate.”176 On January 29, 2016,
Mayor Slay responds via letter that he is excited
about the possibilities with MLS by detailing the
rich history of St. Louis with soccer and its strong
soccer market strength.177 Slay responds, “I was
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thrilled to receive your letter and share your
excitement and commitment to bringing a
professional soccer team to St. Louis, and look
forward to working with you and a strong ownership
group to make this vision a reality.”178 On February
3, 2016, Commissioner Graber writes to Governor
Nixon that he appreciates the phone call and looks
forward to working with him to bring soccer to the
strong St. Louis market.179 Graber states,
As you know, Dave Peacock is coming to meet
with us tomorrow. We will provide Dave with
information on the League and our expansion
process and we anticipate him getting us up to
speed on the latest developments on the stadium
front. We believe that with the right ownership
group and the right stadium plan, St. Louis will
undoubtedly be a leading candidate for MLS
expansion.180
As a result, an MLS taskforce of business and sports
leaders, including St. Louis Cardinals President Bill
DeWitt III and St. Louis Blues CEO Chris
Zimmerman, is collaborating with the St. Louis
Sports Commission in market, stadium, and funding
analysis relative to potential MLS expansion and
ownership.181
As of late August 2016, while St. Louis may be
trying to move on from the NFL, stadium costs and
lawsuits are ongoing. The CVC is responsible for
$16.2 million in stadium proposal expenses and at
least $840,538 in consulting services and $137,230
in legal services since the departure of the Rams.
Relative to legal costs, the CVC is disputing the
ability of the Rams to purchase their former local
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practice facility, worth $19 million, for $1 per the
Rams’ former Dome lease.182 Further, represented
by John Ammann, St. Louis University Professor
and Lawyer, three St. Louis residents, Jeanette Mott
Oxford, Earl Garrett and William White, continue to
try to join a lawsuit filed by the former Dome public
board against St. Louis City to block a public
stadium funding vote. The residents do not believe
the city is serious in its attempts to provide an actual
defense, and the Missouri Supreme Court has
ordered the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
District, to reconsider its previous ruling to not allow
the residents to join the lawsuit.183
Key actors in the Rams saga tend to point to three
key factors relative to the St. Louis departure: the
NFL secret relocation ballots, public officials
preventing a vote by the citizens and/or state
legislature, and the Rams’ first tier stadium lease
clause.184 However, relative to the Rams departure
and St. Louis, the short-term loss of the Rams may
lead to a long term win for St. Louis, especially
relative to sustainability.185 Joe Nocera, New York
Times Op-Ed Columnist, concludes,
Don’t cry for St. Louis, sports fans. The
departure of the Rams to Los Angeles, whence
they came two decades ago, is something for the
city’s residents to cheer, not bemoan. St. Louis
got lucky. . . . But the economics underpinning
Mike Faulk, “Dome Owners Still Spending on Failed
Riverfront Stadium Plan,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 26,
2016, accessed September 5, 2016,
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183
Koran Addo, “St. Louis Stadium Financing Fight Sent Back
to Lower Court,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 23, 2016,
accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louisstadium-financing-fight-sent-back-to-lowercourt/article_59ea3ef6-e6ed-5146-b936-3eba35b74e1f.html.
184
Jim Thomas and David Hunn, “3 Factors That Sank the St.
Louis Effort to Keep the Rams,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
January 23, 2016, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/factorsthat-sank-the-st-louis-effort-to-keep-the/article_817208e5377c-5ffd-baf7-41d00f25e8a0.html.
185
Joe Nocera, “In Losing the Rams, St. Louis Wins,” New
York Times, January 15, 2016, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/sports/football/st-louisshould-be-glad-it-lost-the-rams.html?_r=0.
182

50 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 4 (Fall/Winter 2016-2017)

the recent deal St. Louis and the State of
Missouri tried to put together to keep the Rams
would have been financially ruinous. Let’s not
be coy about this: St. Louis, a city of fewer than
320,000 people, with a shrinking tax base,
simply couldn’t afford to help finance the $1
billion stadium that the Rams’ billionaire owner,
E. Stanley Kroenke, was seeking. Its mistake
was in trying. . . . The N.F.L. claims that St.
Louis always had a real shot at retaining the
Rams, a claim that’s hard to believe. Kroenke
had devised plans to build not just a stadium in
Inglewood but a huge N.F.L. complex, which
would include retail, hotels, the whole bit. It
was a real estate play as much as a football
stadium play. . . . The truth is, whatever the
deficiencies of the proposal from the city and
state, it was more than the city, especially, could
bear. It would have broken St. Louis’s back, and
quite likely forced cutbacks in service that the
city badly needs. And it raises again the
question of whether cities should really be in the
business of subsidizing sports facilities. Is
keeping a football team more important [than]
putting police officers on the street? More
important than giving teachers raises? Of course
not. But mayors and governors can’t bring
themselves to tell a team good riddance when it
threatens to leave. Instead, they move heaven
and earth to keep the team—even if, as in the
case of St. Louis, they can’t afford it. That’s
why the pro sports business model works so
well. It relies on the expectation that
government officials will panic at the thought of
losing a team.186

Final Remarks
Opposed to the locally established St. Louis
Cardinals and St. Louis Blues, St. Louis has twice
tried and twice failed to rent-to-own an NFL team.
Through the Rams debacle, in an attempt to continue
to be a major league city in perception, St. Louis
looks like a minor league city in reality. While the
Rams, particularly Kroenke, and the NFL did not
engage in good faith negotiations with St. Louis, St.
Louis did not engage in good faith negotiations with
186

Ibid.

its citizens. Public officials, both elected and nonelected, should be transparent and accountable,
which helps prevent public servants form putting
their private interests ahead of the public good. As a
result, St. Louis must pursue a more sustainable
path, especially relative to governance reform.
Further, the Rams saga serves as a cautionary tale to
governments throughout the United States,
particularly in corporate welfare and infrastructure
(private) versus social welfare and infrastructure
(public). In public-private partnerships, the devil is
in the details.

